Role of Nuclear Power in America’s Energy Future

Should the United States significantly expand nuclear power—particularly through Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and advanced reactor designs—to meet surging electricity demand from AI, data centers, electric vehicles, and industrial electrification, or should the nation rely primarily on renewable energy sources with natural gas as backup?

This question encompasses fundamental tensions about energy security, climate change, technological innovation, regulatory philosophy, and the proper balance between federal oversight and state autonomy. The debate has intensified as electricity demand is projected to surge 165% by 2030, driven largely by AI infrastructure requiring reliable, carbon-free baseload power. It intersects with concerns about nuclear waste, reactor safety, construction costs, regulatory efficiency, China and Russia’s nuclear dominance, and whether America can maintain technological leadership in a critical strategic sector.

The Atomic Age and Naval Nuclear Propulsion:

America’s nuclear story begins not with civilian power plants but with national security. In March 1939, physicist Enrico Fermi lectured the Department of Defense about nuclear fission’s potential as an inexhaustible energy source. Dr. Ross Gunn from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory recognized its implications for submarine propulsion.

The Manhattan Project (1942-1946) developed atomic weapons, but parallel Navy efforts under Gunn and physicist Philip Abelson explored naval applications. Abelson’s March 1946 report, “Atomic Energy Submarine,” provided the first engineering concepts for nuclear-powered vessels. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, recognizing the strategic value, sent a team including Captain Hyman Rickover to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in June 1946 to study nuclear propulsion feasibility.

Rickover, an electrical engineer with exacting standards, became the driving force behind naval nuclear power. Under his leadership as Director of Naval Reactors (a position he held for 33 years), the Navy built the S1W test reactor at Idaho’s Naval Reactors Facility in 1953. On January 21, 1954, USS Nautilus (SSN-571) was launched—the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine. In 1955, Nautilus famously signaled: “Underway on nuclear power.”

The achievement revolutionized naval warfare. Conventional submarines were submersibles—diesel-electric vessels that had to surface regularly to run engines and recharge batteries. Nuclear submarines became true underwater vessels, capable of sustaining 20-25 knots submerged for months, limited only by crew endurance and supplies, independent of air for diesel engines.

Admiral Rickover’s philosophy shaped naval nuclear power’s extraordinary safety record. He demanded: rigorous engineering standards exceeding commercial requirements; meticulous operator training with personal interviews of every prospective nuclear officer; conservative design with multiple redundant safety systems; and a culture where any crew member could stop operations if safety was questioned.

The results speak for themselves: Since 1948, the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has operated over 500 reactor cores, accumulated more than 5,700 reactor-years of operation, and safely steamed over 134 million miles (later updated to 171 million miles in 2025). The Navy has operated 210 nuclear-powered ships—72 submarines, 11 aircraft carriers, and 9 cruisers (now retired). No U.S. naval reactor has ever experienced a criticality accident, radiation-related fatality, or environmental contamination incident. The average occupational radiation exposure per person monitored since 1958 is 1.03 mSv per year—less than natural background radiation.

Naval reactors use highly enriched uranium in compact pressurized water reactor (PWR) designs. The first submarine core endurance was about 62,000 miles; today’s submarine and carrier cores exceed 1 million miles—essentially the vessel’s lifetime without refueling. Modern carriers like USS Gerald R. Ford require refueling only once in a 50-year service life.

This seven-decade safety record demonstrates that nuclear power, when held to rigorous standards with proper training and oversight, can operate safely even in the most demanding environments: underwater, in combat conditions, with crew living feet from the reactor.

Civilian Nuclear Power Emerges:

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 opened civilian nuclear power development. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program (1953) promoted peaceful nuclear applications. Shippingport Atomic Power Station in Pennsylvania, adapted from naval reactor technology, became America’s first full-scale commercial nuclear plant in 1957.

By the 1960s and 1970s, nuclear power seemed America’s energy future. Orders flooded reactor manufacturers: Westinghouse, General Electric, Combustion Engineering, and Babcock & Wilcox. By 1990, 112 commercial reactors were operating, providing about 20% of U.S. electricity—a share that has remained relatively stable through 2025 even as total electricity generation increased.

Three Mile Island and the Regulatory Shift:

On March 28, 1979, a partial meltdown occurred at Three Mile Island’s Unit 2 reactor near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. A combination of equipment malfunctions, operator errors, and inadequate training led to core damage. Crucially, no one was killed or injured, and radiation release was minimal—the containment structure performed as designed.

But the psychological and political impact was profound. Coming just 12 days after the film “The China Syndrome” premiered (depicting a nuclear meltdown), Three Mile Island crystallized public fears. Media coverage was extensive, often technically imprecise, emphasizing worst-case scenarios.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), established in 1975 when nuclear safety functions were separated from the Atomic Energy Commission’s promotional role, responded with dramatically tightened regulations. Safety standards increased, licensing requirements expanded, and regulatory uncertainty grew. Construction timelines stretched from 6-8 years to 12-15 years or more. Costs exploded.

From 1978 forward, not a single new nuclear plant was ordered in the United States that was ultimately completed. Plants under construction faced massive cost overruns and delays. Several were abandoned mid-construction, representing billions in sunk costs. The Shoreham Nuclear Power Station on Long Island, completed in 1984 at a cost of $6 billion, never operated commercially—it was closed due to political opposition over evacuation planning.

The Seven-Decade Gap:

From 1978 to 2023—45 years—America built no new nuclear reactors beyond those already under construction when Three Mile Island occurred. The last plants to come online were Watts Bar Unit 1 (Tennessee, 1996, though construction began in 1973) and Watts Bar Unit 2 (Tennessee, 2016, also begun in 1973).

This stands in stark contrast to France, which made a national commitment to nuclear power after the 1973 oil crisis and now generates about 70% of its electricity from nuclear plants. China has built 55 reactors since 2000 and has 24 more under construction. Russia, South Korea, and India have active nuclear construction programs.

The U.S. fleet aged. As of 2025, the average U.S. nuclear plant is 42 years old. Many have received 20-year license extensions to operate for 60 years total; some are seeking extensions to 80 years. But eventually, even well-maintained plants must close.

Vogtle and the Return:

In 2012, the NRC approved construction of Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia—the first new reactor construction permits in 34 years. Using Westinghouse’s AP1000 design (a Generation III+ reactor with enhanced passive safety features), Vogtle was meant to demonstrate that America could still build nuclear plants.

The project became a cautionary tale. Originally estimated at $14 billion with completion by 2016-2017, costs ballooned to over $35 billion. Westinghouse’s bankruptcy in 2017 nearly killed the project. Unit 3 finally achieved commercial operation in July 2023; Unit 4 in April 2024—seven years behind schedule.

Yet despite the cost overruns, Vogtle demonstrated that America can build large advanced reactors when committed. And the AP1000 design’s passive safety features—using gravity, natural circulation, and compressed gas rather than pumps and emergency diesel generators—represent genuine safety improvements.

The SMR Revolution Begins:

Researchers at Oregon State University, led by José N. Reyes Jr., invented the first commercial SMR design in 2007. Their work formed the basis for NuScale Power’s commercial SMR. In 2013, NuScale developed the first full-scale SMR prototype.

On August 28, 2020, NuScale received Design Certification from the NRC—the first-ever approval for a commercial SMR in the United States. In January 2023, NuScale received a second Design Certification for an uprated 77 MWe design. By June 2025, NuScale received approval for its VOYGR-4 and VOYGR-6 configurations.

These certifications mark a historic shift. For the first time since Three Mile Island, the United States is approving fundamentally new nuclear technologies designed for factory fabrication, modular deployment, and enhanced safety through passive systems.

Founding Perspectives on Energy and Infrastructure

The Founding Fathers did not envision nuclear power (obviously), but they understood energy and infrastructure as essential to national independence and economic prosperity.

Alexander Hamilton, in his “Report on Manufactures” (1791), argued that federal support for domestic industry and infrastructure was essential to avoid dependence on foreign powers. He advocated for federal investment in roads, canals, and manufacturing to ensure economic independence. Hamilton saw energy independence (in his era, water power and domestic coal) as a national security imperative.

Thomas Jefferson, despite philosophical differences with Hamilton on federal power, recognized infrastructure’s importance. As president, he supported internal improvements and understood that waterways and roads were essential to commerce and defense. Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase (1803) was motivated partly by securing navigation rights and resources.

George Washington, in his Farewell Address (1796), warned against “entangling alliances” and urged policies promoting American self-sufficiency. He understood that economic independence required domestic production capacity and reliable energy sources.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 included provisions for infrastructure development in new territories, recognizing that settlement and economic growth required investment in public works.

The Founders’ philosophy can be summarized: national independence requires economic self-sufficiency, which requires reliable domestic energy and infrastructure. Hamilton explicitly argued in Federalist No. 11 that commercial and naval strength were inseparable from national security.

Translated to modern context: The Founders would likely view dependence on foreign energy sources (whether Middle Eastern oil, Chinese solar panels, or Russian nuclear fuel) as unacceptable threats to sovereignty. They would prioritize policies ensuring America controls its energy destiny—whether through domestic oil and gas, nuclear power, or renewable manufacturing.

Evolving Context

Today’s energy landscape differs dramatically from the Founders’ era—or even from the 1970s when nuclear power peaked:

Electricity Demand Surge: U.S. electricity consumption hit a record in 2024 and is projected to grow 165% by 2030, driven by AI data centers (which could consume 9-13% of total electricity by 2030), electric vehicle charging, industrial electrification, and the economy’s ongoing digitization.

Climate Imperative: The scientific consensus on climate change has created urgency for decarbonization. Nuclear power offers carbon-free baseload electricity—something solar and wind, as intermittent sources, cannot provide alone.

Geopolitical Competition: China operates 55 nuclear reactors, has 24 under construction, and exports reactor technology globally. Russia’s Rosatom has built reactors in 12 countries. The United States risks losing technological leadership and strategic influence if it abandons nuclear innovation.

Technology Advances: Small Modular Reactors represent genuine innovation. Unlike large reactors (1000+ MW) requiring custom, on-site construction over 10-15 years, SMRs (50-300 MW) can be factory-manufactured, transported by truck or rail, and installed in months. Advanced designs use passive safety, alternative coolants (liquid sodium, molten salt), and can even consume existing nuclear waste as fuel.

Naval Proof of Concept: Seven decades of naval nuclear operation demonstrate that properly designed, built, and operated reactors can achieve extraordinary safety. The question is whether civilian nuclear programs can adopt naval-level standards and culture.

The AI-Nuclear Power Nexus:

In 2024-2025, a dramatic shift occurred: major technology companies embraced nuclear power to meet exploding electricity demand from AI infrastructure.

Microsoft (September 2024) signed a 20-year power purchase agreement with Constellation Energy to restart Three Mile Island’s Unit 1 reactor (the undamaged reactor that continued operating until 2019) by 2028, renamed Crane Clean Energy Center. The 835 MW plant will power Microsoft’s data centers.

Amazon (June 2024) announced agreements for nearly 2 GW of nuclear power, including deals with Talen Energy to use power from Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna nuclear plant. Amazon also invested in X-energy’s SMR technology and plans to develop SMRs near existing power infrastructure.

Meta (June 2025) signed a 20-year agreement with Constellation to extend operation of Illinois’ 1,100 MW Clinton Clean Energy Center, previously scheduled for 2027 retirement.

Google (October 2025) partnered with NextEra Energy to restart Iowa’s Duane Arnold Energy Center (615 MW), closed since 2020, with operations targeted for early 2029. Google also signed agreements with Commonwealth Fusion Systems for 200 MW from a proposed nuclear fusion plant in Virginia by the early 2030s.

Oracle announced plans for a data center powered directly by three small nuclear reactors.

These deals reflect a strategic calculus: tech companies have committed to net-zero carbon goals by 2030-2040 but recognize that renewables alone cannot provide reliable 24/7 baseload power at the scale needed. A typical AI data center consumes as much electricity as 100,000 households; the largest hyperscale facilities under construction will consume 20 times more.

Natural gas currently supplies over 40% of data center electricity, but using gas contradicts carbon commitments. Nuclear offers carbon-free, reliable baseload power available 24/7/365 regardless of weather.

Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Progress:

As of July 2025, the Nuclear Energy Agency’s SMR Dashboard tracks 127 SMR designs globally, with 74 featured in detailed assessments. Seven designs are operating or under construction; 51 are in pre-licensing or licensing processes.

Only China and Russia have successfully built operational SMRs to date. Russia’s Akademik Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant has operated commercially since 2020 in Pevek. China’s pebble-bed modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR-PM) connected to the grid in 2021.

The United States is catching up. Key projects include:

TerraPower Natrium (Wyoming): Bill Gates-backed TerraPower began construction in June 2024 on a 345 MWe sodium-cooled fast reactor at Kemmerer, Wyoming—a retiring coal plant site. The innovative design includes an integrated molten salt energy storage system that can boost output to 500 MWe for over five hours, enabling integration with intermittent renewables.

TerraPower submitted its construction permit application to the NRC in March 2024—the first developer to do so for a commercial advanced reactor. The NRC completed its Final Environmental Impact Statement in October 2025, finding no adverse impacts and recommending permit approval. Final safety evaluation is expected by December 31, 2025. If approved, the plant could operate by 2029-2030.

The project has raised over $1.4 billion in private capital, including a $650 million round in June 2025 led by Nvidia’s NVentures, plus Bill Gates and HD Hyundai. Combined with $2 billion in federal support from the Department of Energy’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP), total funding exceeds $3.4 billion.

Significantly, Bechtel—which built Vogtle and has decades of nuclear construction experience—is the engineering, procurement, and construction partner. This brings institutional knowledge often lacking in startup nuclear ventures.

NuScale Power: After receiving NRC Design Certification, NuScale faced a significant setback in November 2023 when its Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems project was canceled due to cost concerns. However, NuScale secured international opportunities: Romania signed agreements for a NuScale project, and several other countries are evaluating the technology.

NuScale’s uprated 77 MWe design received Standard Design Approval in June 2025. The company is targeting deployment by 2030 and remains the only SMR technology company with full NRC design approval.

GE Hitachi BWRX-300: GE Hitachi’s 300 MWe boiling water SMR received significant backing. In January 2024, GE secured a £33.6 million grant from the UK Department for Energy Security & Net Zero. As of March 2025, the BWRX-300 is progressing through UK Generic Design Assessment and is a contender in Great British Nuclear’s SMR competition.

Globally, Canada’s Ontario Power Generation is building a BWRX-300 at the Darlington site, targeting 2028 operation. This represents the first commercial SMR deployment in a Western democracy. In January 2025, OPG made the final investment decision to proceed, based on a forecast cost of CA$7.7 billion (US$5.6 billion) for the first unit.

Poland and Romania have expressed interest in deploying BWRX-300s as coal plant replacements.

X-energy Xe-100: X-energy’s high-temperature gas-cooled reactor design is the other ARDP awardee alongside TerraPower. The company is advancing its design and has secured partnerships with several utilities.

The Liquid Sodium Cooling Debate:

A central technical controversy involves advanced reactor coolants. Most existing U.S. commercial reactors use light water (ordinary H₂O) as both coolant and neutron moderator. Light water reactors (LWRs) operate at high pressure (around 2,200 psi for PWRs) to keep water liquid at temperatures above its normal boiling point.

Advanced designs explore alternative coolants offering potential safety and efficiency advantages:

Liquid Sodium: Sodium’s boiling point is 883°C (1,621°F) at atmospheric pressure—far above typical reactor operating temperatures of 500-550°C. This means sodium-cooled reactors can operate at near-atmospheric pressure, eliminating the risk of pressurized steam explosions that doomed Chernobyl.

Sodium-cooled “fast reactors” use fast neutrons rather than thermal (slow) neutrons for fission. This offers two significant advantages: (1) they can “breed” fuel by converting non-fissile uranium-238 (99.3% of natural uranium) into fissile plutonium-239, dramatically extending fuel resources; (2) they can consume long-lived actinides in existing nuclear waste, reducing waste storage requirements from millennia to centuries.

However, sodium’s Achilles’ heel is that it reacts violently with water, producing sodium hydroxide and hydrogen gas. If sodium leaks from the reactor coolant system and contacts water from the steam generators, the resulting chemical reaction could be catastrophic in a confined space.

Naval reactors briefly experimented with liquid sodium. USS Seawolf (SSN-575) used a sodium-cooled reactor (S2G) that operated successfully for two years (1957-1958). However, repeated leaks in the steam generators and concerns about sodium-water reactions in submarine confinement led the Navy to replace it with a conventional PWR. This experience informed Admiral Rickover’s decision that all subsequent naval reactors would use pressurized water.

Critics, often citing this naval experience, argue sodium-cooled reactors are inherently unsafe. The NRC historically expressed concerns about licensing sodium-cooled designs.

Proponents, including Bill Gates and TerraPower, counter that modern engineering has solved these challenges:

1. Intermediate coolant loops: TerraPower’s Natrium design uses three separate coolant systems. The primary sodium loop never contacts water. Heat transfers to a secondary molten salt system, which then produces steam in a tertiary loop. If a leak occurs, sodium and water never meet.

2. Passive safety: If power is lost, natural circulation and convection cool the reactor without pumps. The reactor can be passively cooled for days with no human intervention or external power.

3. Operational experience: Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) at Idaho National Laboratory operated successfully from 1964 to 1994 using sodium cooling. Argonne National Laboratory’s demonstration in 1986 showed that EBR-II could safely shut down using passive cooling with no operator action—even with all safety systems disabled.

4. International deployment: France operated the Phénix sodium-cooled reactor from 1973 to 2009. Russia operates the BN-600 and BN-800 sodium-cooled reactors. These plants accumulated decades of operational experience, demonstrating that sodium cooling is technically viable.

5. Physics advantages outweigh risks: The ability to consume existing nuclear waste and breed fuel from depleted uranium addresses two major public concerns about nuclear power. The low-pressure operation and passive safety features arguably make sodium-cooled reactors safer than high-pressure water reactors once the chemical reactivity issue is properly engineered around.

The debate encapsulates a broader tension: Should regulators demand conventional approaches with known risks, or permit innovative designs that introduce different risks but potentially solve existing problems?

NRC Regulatory Reform—Or Obstacle?

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission faces intense criticism from both directions:

Industry and Innovation Advocates argue the NRC has become a bottleneck:

The NRC took six years (2017-2023) to review and approve NuScale’s first SMR design—the first new reactor design certified in decades. Critics note that naval reactors advanced from concept to operation in six years in the 1950s.

In January 2020, the NRC rejected Oklo Inc.’s application for its Aurora sodium-cooled microreactor—a rare outright rejection. Former NRC Chair Allison Macfarlane stated: “If you read the NRC’s documents on this, they were clearly extremely frustrated by Oklo just ignoring them. They asked questions over and over. They never got answers.” However, Oklo CEO Jacob DeWitte attributed the derailment to pandemic disruptions and the NRC piloting a new review process.

A 2023 Government Accountability Office report found potential licensing logjams due to NRC staffing challenges. The agency struggles to recruit and retain technical experts, competing with higher-paying private sector jobs. In fiscal 2023, the NRC set a goal to hire 400 new staff but brought on only 281—about 160 positions short.

The NRC’s use of the Linear No-Threshold (LNT) model for radiation exposure assumes any radiation dose carries risk with no safe threshold. Critics argue this is scientifically outdated—radiation below certain thresholds appears safe, and the LNT model’s overly conservative standards impose unnecessary costs. The Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and EPA use different standards for their operations, suggesting the NRC’s approach is excessively cautious.

The proposed Part 53 regulation for advanced reactors, mandated by the 2019 Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) with a December 2027 deadline, has faced criticism for being overly prescriptive and burdensome. In March 2024, NRC commissioners ordered major revisions to reduce regulatory requirements, but concerns remain about whether the final rule will enable or hinder innovation.

Safety advocates and critics counter that the NRC’s caution is necessary:

Three Mile Island, Chernobyl (1986), and Fukushima (2011) demonstrate that nuclear accidents, while rare, have catastrophic consequences. Regulatory conservatism is warranted.

The nuclear industry has a history of overpromising and underdelivering on costs and schedules. Vogtle’s $35 billion cost overrun and seven-year delay vindicate regulatory caution.

The NRC’s thoroughness, while slow, has produced an excellent U.S. commercial nuclear safety record. No commercial reactor accident in U.S. history has caused a radiation-related death.

Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists warns that Trump administration efforts to cut NRC staffing will “take talent and resources away from oversight and inspections and put them into licensing,” potentially compromising safety.

President Trump’s Executive Order (May 23, 2025):

President Trump issued Executive Order 14300, “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” which directs the NRC to:

1. Reconsider the Linear No-Threshold model and “as low as reasonably achievable” standards, potentially adopting deterministic radiation limits in consultation with DOD, DOE, and EPA.

2. Expedite licensing by establishing 12-month and 18-month review milestones for certain applications, as specified in the NEIMA and ADVANCE Acts.

3. Reduce staff in areas not directly related to licensing new reactors, while potentially increasing staff working on new reactor approvals. The order mandates “streamlining” NRC operations while “facilitating increased deployment” of advanced nuclear technologies.

4. Revise environmental review regulations to reflect 2023 amendments to the National Environmental Policy Act and the policies in Executive Order 14154 (“Unleashing American Energy”).

5. Facilitate expansion from approximately 100 GW of nuclear capacity in 2024 to 400 GW by 2050—a quadrupling of capacity.

Critics, including congressional Democrats and safety advocates, warn that cutting regulatory staff at an agency already struggling to meet hiring goals could compromise safety. Supporters argue the NRC has become risk-averse and innovation-blocking, and that reform is essential to American nuclear leadership.

The State Regulation Proposal:

Trump administration officials have floated the idea that small reactors below a certain power threshold should be regulated by states rather than the federal NRC. This proposal reflects broader conservative philosophy about federal overreach and state sovereignty.

In March 2025, Texas, Utah, and a private microreactor manufacturer sued the NRC under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the NRC lacks statutory authority to include small reactors (with fewer safety concerns than large reactors) within its “utilization facility” licensing requirements. The lawsuit claims that exempting small reactors from NRC licensing would dramatically reduce time and expense while reducing oversight only marginally.

The NRC moved to dismiss on procedural grounds, invoking the Hobbs Act’s requirement that NRC decisions be reviewed by federal circuit courts, not district courts.

Arguments for state regulation of small reactors:

States successfully regulate many industrial facilities with hazardous materials. Nuclear microreactors (1-20 MW) pose far less risk than large reactors (1,000+ MW). – State regulation would be faster and more responsive to local needs. – Reduces federal bureaucracy and respects the Tenth Amendment. – States could adopt different regulatory approaches, allowing innovation and experimentation—the “laboratories of democracy” concept.

Arguments against:

Nuclear safety requires consistent national standards. Fragmented state-by-state regulation could create a “race to the bottom” as states compete for nuclear development. Most states lack technical expertise in nuclear engineering and radiation safety that the NRC has developed over decades. Interstate and international implications (nuclear materials transport, waste disposal, proliferation concerns) require federal coordination. – The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established federal jurisdiction over nuclear materials precisely because nuclear technology’s national security implications require central control.

Congressional Action—The ADVANCE Act:

In a rare display of bipartisanship, Congress passed the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act (ADVANCE Act) in July 2024. The bill, which passed the House 393-13 and the Senate by unanimous consent, directs the NRC to:

↳ Establish a reduced hourly rate for advanced reactor applicants: $148/hour vs. $318/hour—over 50% reduction.

↳ Develop technology-neutral, risk-informed licensing frameworks under Part 53.

↳ Streamline environmental reviews and establish protocols for siting reactors on brownfield sites (former industrial properties).

↳ Accelerate licensing timelines with specific milestones.

↳ Establish a prize program for successful advanced reactor deployment.

The ADVANCE Act represents congressional frustration with NRC pace and a determination to facilitate nuclear innovation.

High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) Fuel Challenge:

Most advanced reactors require HALEU—uranium enriched to 5-20% U-235, compared to 3-5% for conventional reactors. This higher enrichment allows smaller, more efficient reactor designs.

The problem: Russia’s TENEX is currently the only commercial supplier of HALEU globally. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. policymakers recognized the strategic vulnerability of depending on Russian nuclear fuel.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 allocated funding for domestic HALEU production. Centrus Energy’s facility in Piketon, Ohio began producing HALEU in 2023. In September 2024, TerraPower signed an agreement with ASP Isotopes to build a HALEU enrichment facility in South Africa using laser-based enrichment technology.

However, scaling domestic production to meet projected demand will take years. TerraPower delayed its Wyoming plant’s completion from 2028 to 2030 specifically because of HALEU supply constraints.

Waste Disposal Remains Unresolved:

The United States has no permanent repository for high-level nuclear waste. The Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada, authorized in 1987 and selected in 2002, was defunded by the Obama administration in 2011 following intense political opposition from Nevada politicians (including Senator Harry Reid, then Senate Majority Leader).

Spent fuel currently sits in “temporary” storage at reactor sites—pools and dry casks—decades after “temporary” was supposed to end. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 required the federal government to take custody of spent fuel by 1998. The government’s failure to do so has cost taxpayers over $8 billion in damages paid to utilities for breach of contract.

Finland’s Onkalo repository became the world’s first deep geological repository for high-level nuclear waste to begin operations (trial operations started in 2023, with full operations planned for 2025). Sweden, France, and other countries are advancing repository programs.

The irony: naval spent fuel, which constitutes only 0.05% of all U.S. spent fuel, has well-established disposal procedures. Spent naval fuel goes to Idaho National Laboratory’s Naval Reactors Facility for examination and processing. Reactor compartments from decommissioned submarines are sealed and buried at Hanford, Washington—a Superfund site with established procedures.

If naval nuclear waste can be safely managed with rigorous procedures, why can’t civilian waste? The answer is political, not technical.

Advanced reactors offer potential solutions. Fast reactors like TerraPower’s Natrium can consume long-lived actinides in existing waste, converting waste management from a millennium-scale problem to a centuries-scale problem. But without waste disposal solutions, public resistance to nuclear expansion will persist.

Fiscal conservatives increasingly support nuclear power expansion, though the position balances enthusiasm for market-driven innovation with concerns about government subsidies and regulatory efficiency.

Energy Security and Economic Independence:

America’s dependence on foreign energy sources—whether Middle Eastern oil, Chinese solar panels and batteries, or Russian uranium—represents a strategic vulnerability and economic drain. Every dollar sent abroad for energy is a dollar not circulating in the American economy.

Nuclear power offers energy independence. The United States has significant domestic uranium reserves. With advanced reactors capable of breeding fuel from depleted uranium (of which the U.S. has 700,000 metric tons in storage), fuel supply could last centuries or millennia.

Energy independence enables aggressive foreign policy without fear of oil embargoes or supply disruptions. It insulates the economy from volatile global energy markets. It keeps jobs and profits in America.

Baseload Power for Economic Growth:

Reliable, affordable electricity is the foundation of modern economic prosperity. Manufacturing, data centers, electric vehicle charging, and increasingly electrified economy all require abundant, cheap power available 24/7/365.

Solar and wind are intermittent. They require massive battery storage or backup generation—typically natural gas—to provide reliable power. Battery storage at the scale needed costs trillions and requires massive mining for lithium, cobalt, and rare earths—largely controlled by China.

Nuclear provides carbon-free baseload power that operates continuously regardless of weather. A single 1,000 MW nuclear plant on 1 square mile can generate as much annual electricity as wind farms covering 360 square miles or solar farms covering 75 square miles.

For industries requiring massive reliable power—steel, aluminum, chemical production, and data centers—nuclear is often the only carbon-free option that works economically.

Market-Driven Innovation:

The recent surge in private investment in nuclear—Nvidia investing in TerraPower, tech giants signing billion-dollar power purchase agreements, SMR startups raising capital—demonstrates genuine market demand untainted by government mandates.

When Microsoft commits $2 billion-plus to restart Three Mile Island, when Amazon invests in X-energy, when Oracle designs data centers around small reactors, these are hard-headed business decisions based on cost-benefit analysis and strategic need. This is capitalism identifying and solving problems.

Government’s role should be removing regulatory barriers, not picking winners. The ADVANCE Act’s fee reductions and streamlined licensing are appropriate: government created the problem (excessive regulation), government should fix it.

R&D Support Is Appropriate:

Federal support for basic nuclear research, analogous to DARPA funding defense technology or NIH funding medical research, is legitimate. Nuclear technology has national security implications justifying public investment.

The Department of Energy’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program ($3.2 billion over seven years, with matching private funds) is defensible as accelerating deployment of strategic technology. But ongoing operational subsidies create market distortions.

Cost Overruns Are Unacceptable:

Vogtle’s cost escalation from $14 billion to $35 billion—a 150% overrun—is inexcusable in any industry. Ratepayers and taxpayers bear these costs. The nuclear industry must demonstrate it can control costs before claiming to be economically competitive.

SMRs promise cost advantages through factory fabrication and standardization. These claims must be proven, not assumed. NuScale’s Utah project collapsed due to cost concerns. Canada’s first BWRX-300 is forecast at CA$7.7 billion. Until SMRs are built at scale and actual costs verified, skepticism is warranted.

Waste Disposal Requires Private Sector Solutions:

Government has failed for 40 years to solve nuclear waste disposal despite billions spent. Perhaps the market could solve it more efficiently. Private companies could bid for contracts to build and operate repositories, with performance bonds ensuring long-term liability coverage.

Advanced reactors that consume existing waste should receive market-based incentives. If a TerraPower reactor can convert 100,000 years of waste into 500 years of waste while generating electricity, that value should be monetized.

Internal Tensions:

Some fiscal conservatives acknowledge tensions:

1. Subsidies vs. National Security: Nuclear technology has genuine national security value justifying public support, but where is the line? Should government subsidize uneconomic projects indefinitely?

2. Regulation vs. Safety: Excessive regulation drives costs up and innovation down, but nuclear accidents (see Fukushima’s $200+ billion cleanup costs) can destroy entire regions’ economies. Finding optimal regulation is difficult.

3. Waste Storage Politics: Conservatives generally oppose federal intervention, but nuclear waste disposal may require federal action to override parochial state opposition. How can federalist principles be reconciled with practical necessity?

4. Climate Urgency: Some conservatives question whether climate change justifies massive nuclear expansion. Others recognize that if climate risks are real, nuclear is essential and delay is costly.

5. China Competition: Chinese state-backed nuclear exports threaten U.S. strategic interests. Should government support American nuclear companies to compete with Chinese subsidized offerings, even if this means government intervention in markets?

Progressives are divided on nuclear power—a split reflecting competing priorities around climate urgency, environmental justice, safety concerns, and corporate power.

The Climate Imperative:

A growing number of progressives, including former nuclear opponents, now support nuclear expansion as essential to decarbonization. The math is straightforward: meeting net-zero goals by 2050 while electrifying transportation, heating, and industry requires doubling or tripling electricity generation. Building that capacity entirely from intermittent renewables is implausible.

The International Energy Agency’s net-zero pathway requires global nuclear capacity to reach 910 GW by 2050—more than double today’s capacity. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that 90 pathways to limit warming to 1.5°C require, on average, nuclear capacity increasing to 1,160 GW by 2050.

Germany’s nuclear phase-out offers a cautionary lesson. After Fukushima, Germany closed its nuclear plants and committed to renewable expansion. Result: Germany increased coal use, expanded natural gas imports from Russia (creating strategic vulnerability exposed by Ukraine invasion), and now has among Europe’s highest electricity costs and carbon emissions per capita. Renewables grew, but not fast enough to replace nuclear plus fossil fuels simultaneously.

Environmental Justice and Community Consent:

Nuclear plants have historically been sited in low-income communities and communities of color with limited political power to resist. Navajo uranium miners died from radiation exposure. Nuclear waste disproportionately affects Indigenous lands.

Any nuclear expansion must prioritize environmental justice:

↳ Community consent for siting decisions, with affected communities having genuine decision-making power, not merely consultation.

↳ Economic benefits (jobs, tax revenue) flowing to host communities, not just risks.

↳ No siting on Indigenous lands without tribal sovereignty respected.

↳  Worker protections ensuring no repeat of uranium miners’ tragedies.

↳  Waste storage solutions that don’t sacrifice vulnerable communities.

SMRs offer potential advantages: they can replace retiring coal plants, converting environmental liabilities into assets while preserving community jobs and tax bases. Kemmerer, Wyoming (population 2,700) embraced TerraPower’s project because it replaces a closing coal plant that’s the town’s economic anchor.

Safety Remains Paramount:

Fukushima demonstrated that even modern reactors with rigorous safety cultures can fail catastrophically when multiple low-probability events coincide (earthquake plus tsunami plus design flaws plus poor emergency response). The 100,000+ evacuees, $200+ billion cleanup costs, and ongoing contamination show accidents’ true costs.

Progressives therefore support:

↳ Strong, independent regulatory oversight. Trump administration cuts to NRC staffing are dangerous.

↳ Conservative safety standards. The LNT model may be imperfect science, but erring on the side of caution regarding radiation exposure is appropriate.

↳ Continuous learning from accidents. Each failure should strengthen regulations, not justify regulatory relaxation.

↳ Transparency about risks. Nuclear advocates’ tendency to downplay risks and costs undermines public trust.

However, many progressives now recognize that fossil fuel air pollution kills far more people annually (estimated 8-9 million deaths globally) than nuclear accidents have killed in 70 years (under 100 directly attributed deaths from Chernobyl; Fukushima caused zero radiation deaths, though evacuation stress contributed to ~2,000 deaths).

Public vs. Private Development:

Nuclear power’s history demonstrates that private markets, left alone, won’t build reactors. Construction costs and timelines exceed what purely private capital can bear. Every major nuclear program—U.S., France, China, Russia—required substantial government support.

Progressives argue that if nuclear is essential for climate goals, it should be developed as public infrastructure, analogous to the Tennessee Valley Authority or rural electrification. Public development could:

↳  Ensure democratic accountability and community input.

↳ Capture economic benefits for taxpayers, not private shareholders.

↳ Prioritize safety and sustainability over profit maximization.

↳ Coordinate with renewable deployment and grid modernization.

The alternative—relying on corporations like Bill Gates’ TerraPower, with its ties to tech giants and concentrated wealth—risks privatizing benefits while socializing risks and costs.

Renewables First, Nuclear If Necessary:

Most progressives prioritize renewable expansion over nuclear. Solar and wind are cheaper per kWh, faster to deploy, create more jobs per dollar invested, and carry zero meltdown risk.

The progressive energy portfolio: maximize energy efficiency, deploy renewables aggressively, build battery storage and grid interconnections, and use nuclear only where renewables genuinely cannot meet needs (extreme northern latitudes, industrial high heat, baseload for critical infrastructure).

This approach requires acknowledging renewables’ limits. The sun doesn’t shine at night; wind is intermittent; batteries at scale require massive mining with environmental and human rights costs; and transmission lines face siting challenges rivaling nuclear plants.

Nuclear Waste Is Unresolved:

Progressives emphasize that nuclear generates waste that remains hazardous for millennia. Saying “advanced reactors solve waste” sidesteps that no existing commercial fast reactors operate at scale. Betting climate strategy on unproven technology is risky.

Yucca Mountain’s failure demonstrates that waste disposal is politically, not just technically, difficult. No state wants to be America’s nuclear dump. Without permanent solutions, nuclear expansion is irresponsible.

Counter-argument from pro-nuclear progressives: We know how to safely store nuclear waste. Finland proved it with Onkalo. The waste problem is political will, not physics. Meanwhile, fossil fuels create “waste” (CO₂) dumped into atmosphere, causing climate catastrophe. At least nuclear waste can be contained.

Internal Tensions:

Progressive nuclear supporters face criticism:

1. Selling Out to Corporations: Allying with Bill Gates, tech giants, and fossil fuel interests (many oil companies now support nuclear) raises questions about whose interests are served.

2. Opportunity Costs: Every dollar spent on nuclear could fund more renewable capacity, energy efficiency, or grid improvements. Are we choosing the right investments?

3. Technological Solutionism: Relying on nuclear (or any technology) can distract from addressing consumption, inequality, and systemic change. Real climate solutions require reducing consumption, not just greening it.

4. Safety vs. Speed: The urgency of climate action suggests we should deploy what works fastest (renewables) rather than hoping nuclear innovation delivers. But climate urgency also suggests we need every carbon-free option available.

5. Global South Justice: Exporting American SMRs to developing countries could perpetuate neo-colonial relationships. Or it could provide climate-friendly development. Which framing is correct depends on governance structures and who benefits.

Several paths forward could bridge partisan divides while addressing concerns from both perspectives:

Option 1: Dual-Track Strategy—Renewables + Advanced Nuclear

Deploy renewables and nuclear in parallel, recognizing they serve complementary roles:

↳ Renewables provide low-cost, distributed energy for variable loads.

↳ Nuclear provides reliable baseload for critical infrastructure, industrial heat, and grid stability.

From a conservative perspective: Market forces are already driving this. Tech companies are signing both solar/wind PPAs and nuclear agreements. Government’s role is removing obstacles, not mandating outcomes.

From a progressive perspective: Massive renewable deployment with nuclear as strategic backup for hardest-to-decarbonize sectors is acceptable if safety, waste, and environmental justice concerns are addressed.

Implementation:

↳ Triple renewable capacity by 2035 (solar, wind, geothermal).

↳ Build 50-100 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2040 (mix of large plants and SMRs).

↳ Prioritize siting nuclear at retiring coal plants to preserve jobs and use existing infrastructure.

↳ Federal loan guarantees for first-of-kind advanced reactors to reduce financial risk.

↳ Accelerated permitting for both renewables and nuclear.

Option 2: State-Sized Reactors, Rigorous Federal Safety Standards

Allow small reactors (under 50-100 MW) streamlined federal licensing with some state regulatory involvement, while large reactors remain under full NRC oversight.

From a conservative perspective: Reduces federal bureaucracy, respects state sovereignty, enables innovation, and allows regulatory experimentation.

From a progressive perspective: Acceptable if federal safety floor remains strong. States can exceed federal standards but not fall below. Microreactors genuinely pose less catastrophic risk than gigawatt-scale plants.

Implementation:

↳ NRC establishes technology-neutral safety performance standards rather than prescriptive regulations.

↳ Reactors under 50 MW with passive safety features qualify for expedited review.

↳ States may participate in licensing review and have say in siting.

↳ Federal oversight of fuel cycle, waste disposal, security, and emergency planning remains.

↳ Independent federal inspections and enforcement even for state-licensed facilities.

Option 3: Naval Standards for Civilian Nuclear

Adopt the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program’s culture and standards for civilian advanced reactors.

From a conservative perspective: The Navy’s perfect safety record over seven decades proves what rigorous standards + operator training + strong culture achieve. Civilian nuclear should learn from this success.

From a progressive perspective: If nuclear must expand, naval-level standards provide confidence. The challenge is whether profit-motivated civilian operators can sustain Navy culture.

Implementation: ↳  Advanced reactor operators must establish Admiral Rickover-level training programs: intensive, continuous, with personal accountability.

↳ Operators must meet naval standards for radiation exposure, maintenance procedures, and safety culture—not just minimum NRC requirements.

↳ Independent oversight board (perhaps involving former naval nuclear personnel) audits civilian programs.

↳ Zero tolerance for safety violations, with criminal liability for executives who prioritize cost over safety.

↳ Government funding for training programs to ensure operators aren’t cutting corners due to costs.

Option 4: Public-Private Partnership Model

Government handles high-risk, low-return components (waste disposal, fuel cycle, insurance, R&D) while private sector handles construction and operation.

From a conservative perspective: Appropriate division of responsibilities. Government handles what markets can’t (nuclear waste, proliferation), private sector handles what it can (power generation). Avoids either pure nationalization or pure privatization.

From a progressive perspective: Ensures public interest and accountability. Private profit motive disciplined by government oversight and public infrastructure support.

Implementation:

↳ Federal waste disposal: Government builds and operates repositories using Onkalo model, funded by waste fees from utilities.

↳ Public fuel bank: Federal entity manages HALEU production and supply to prevent market manipulation or foreign dependence.

↳ Price Anderson Act maintained with higher industry contribution to risk pool.

↳ DOE continues ARDP-style support for demonstration projects.

↳ Regulatory efficiency reforms in NRC while maintaining safety standards.

↳ Private financing and operation for commercial plants, with PPAs driving deployment.

Any nuclear expansion requires safeguards to protect public safety, environmental quality, fiscal responsibility, and democratic accountability:

Safety and Regulatory Oversight:

↳ Independent NRC: Maintain NRC’s independence from industry and political pressure. Reforms to improve efficiency must not compromise safety mission.

↳ Performance-Based Standards: Shift from prescriptive regulations to outcome-based standards allowing innovation while ensuring safety.

↳ Continuous Improvement: Require operators to implement lessons learned from global incidents (Fukushima, etc.).

↳ Whistleblower Protections: Strong protections for workers reporting safety concerns without retaliation.

↳ Criminal Liability: Executives face criminal prosecution for willful safety violations.

Waste Management:

↳ Federal Repository: Government commits to permanent repository, with site selection process respecting state/community consent.

↳ Interim Storage: Consolidated interim storage facilities with robust community oversight and economic benefits sharing.

↳ Waste Minimization: Advanced reactors consuming long-lived waste receive regulatory and economic incentives.

↳ Transportation Safety: Rigorous standards for spent fuel transportation with community notification and emergency planning.

Community Consent and Environmental Justice:

↳ Genuine Consultation: Affected communities have decision-making role, not mere consultation, in siting decisions.

↳ Economic Benefit Sharing: Host communities receive guaranteed tax revenue, job training, and economic development support.

↳ Environmental Review: Comprehensive NEPA review with genuine public input.

↳ Emergency Planning: Realistic evacuation plans; communities within 50-mile radius have veto power if emergency planning is inadequate.

↳ No Disproportionate Impact: Environmental justice screen ensures nuclear facilities don’t disproportionately burden disadvantaged communities.

Fiscal Accountability:

↳ Cost Caps: Federal loan guarantees and support contingent on meeting cost targets within defined ranges (e.g., ±20%).

↳ Clawback Provisions: If projects exceed cost targets without justification, federal support is reduced or requires repayment.

↳ Third-Party Cost Estimating: Independent cost review before major federal commitments.

↳ Ratepayer Protections: State public utility commissions ensure cost overruns aren’t automatically passed to ratepayers.

↳ Competitive Procurement: Government contracts awarded competitively, not sole-source.

Transparency:

↳ Public Safety Reports: Regular public reporting on plant safety performance, incidents, and radiation releases.

↳ Cost Disclosure: Full cost transparency for federally supported projects.

↳ Research Access: Publicly funded nuclear R&D results made available to researchers.

↳ Security-Sensitive Information: Balance transparency with legitimate security concerns about sabotage or proliferation.

Sunset Provisions and Review:

↳ Demonstration Phase: First 10-20 advanced reactors treated as demonstration projects with enhanced oversight.

↳ Performance Review (2035): Congress mandates comprehensive review of advanced nuclear program by 2035: Are safety goals met? Are costs competitive? Is deployment on track? Are alternatives (fusion, improved renewables) viable?

↳ Adjust or Exit: Based on 2035 review, Congress decides whether to continue, scale back, or terminate advanced nuclear support.

International Coordination:

↳ Non-Proliferation: Strict controls on fuel enrichment and reprocessing to prevent weapons proliferation.

↳ Export Controls: U.S. nuclear technology exports only to countries with strong non-proliferation commitments.

↳ Harmonized Safety Standards: Work through IAEA to align safety standards among nuclear nations.

↳ Compete with China/Russia: U.S. must offer alternative to Chinese/Russian nuclear exports that often come with fewer safeguards.

The nuclear power debate encapsulates America’s broader struggles: Can we balance innovation with safety? Economic growth with environmental protection? Federal authority with state sovereignty? Present needs with future obligations?

The United States pioneered nuclear power—both for weapons and peaceful uses. Admiral Rickover’s Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program demonstrated that nuclear energy could be harnessed safely when held to uncompromising standards. Seven decades and 160 million miles later, not a single U.S. naval reactor has caused a radiation death or environmental contamination.

Yet civilian nuclear power, starting from the same technological foundation, became mired in cost overruns, regulatory battles, public fear, and political paralysis. For 45 years, America built no new nuclear plants. Meanwhile, China built 55 reactors and leads the world in nuclear innovation. Russia and China export reactors globally, expanding their strategic influence while America retreated.

Now, driven by AI’s insatiable electricity demand and climate imperatives, nuclear power has a second chance. Tech giants are betting billions that Small Modular Reactors and advanced designs can deliver reliable, carbon-free power at competitive costs. Bill Gates personally chairs TerraPower. Nvidia’s venture arm invested. Oracle is designing data centers around nuclear cores.

This is not government diktat—it’s market-driven demand meeting technological innovation.

The question is whether America can execute. Can the NRC evolve from 1970s-era prescriptive regulation to 21st-century risk-informed oversight? Can industry demonstrate that SMRs actually are cheaper, faster, and safer than promised—rather than repeating large reactor failures? Can communities trust that nuclear expansion won’t sacrifice them to corporate profit? Can waste disposal finally move from political football to engineered solutions?

The Founding Fathers faced an analogous choice in their time: whether to depend on British manufactures and imports, or invest in domestic industry and infrastructure to secure independence. Hamilton’s vision of federal support for strategic industries prevailed. The transcontinental railroad, rural electrification, the Interstate Highway System, and the space program all reflected the principle that government has a role in building infrastructure essential to national prosperity and security.

Energy independence is the 21st century equivalent. America cannot be a superpower if it depends on adversaries for energy or cedes technological leadership to China and Russia. Nuclear power—especially advanced reactors that can consume existing waste, breed fuel from depleted uranium, and provide decades of carbon-free electricity—is strategic infrastructure.

But the Founders also warned against concentrated power and unchecked authority. Nuclear technology’s risks demand oversight. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima remind us that when nuclear fails, it fails spectacularly. Communities living near reactors deserve genuine safety assurances, not corporate promises.

The tension is real: Innovation requires accepting some risk and allowing experimentation. Safety requires caution and learning from failures. The Navy balanced these by: adopting the most conservative approach to reactor design; training operators to the highest standards; accepting higher costs for safety; and refusing to compromise.

Can civilian nuclear power adopt a similar ethos? Or will cost pressures, shareholder demands, and regulatory fatigue lead to cutting corners?

The optimistic case: Modern SMR designs with passive safety features, lessons learned from 70 years of operation, and computational modeling enabling far better engineering, can deliver nuclear power safer and cheaper than ever before. TerraPower’s Natrium, with its sodium cooling, molten salt storage, and passive safety, represents genuine innovation. GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300, designed to be 60% cheaper than previous reactors, could finally make nuclear economically competitive.

The pessimistic case: Nuclear promises always exceed delivery. Costs overrun. Schedules slip. Unanticipated problems emerge. Regulatory shortcuts taken in the name of “efficiency” compromise safety. And a single major accident—especially involving new technology—could end nuclear power for another generation.

The stakes are high. Climate change is accelerating. U.S. electricity demand is surging. China and Russia are aggressive. America needs abundant, reliable, carbon-free energy now—not in some distant future.

Whether nuclear power fulfills that need or disappoints again depends on choices made in the next 5-10 years: Will Congress provide stable policy? Will regulators balance safety with efficiency? Will industry deliver on its promises? Will communities consent? Will waste disposal finally be solved?

There are no guarantees. History teaches that nuclear power is neither savior nor demon—it is a powerful technology that reflects the society deploying it. If approached with Admiral Rickover’s discipline, comprehensive safety culture, and unflinching honesty about costs and risks, nuclear can be part of America’s energy future.

If approached with wishful thinking, cost-cutting, regulatory capture, or dismissal of genuine concerns, nuclear will fail again—and take climate goals with it.

The Founders built a system of checks and balances, recognizing that power without accountability corrupts, that good intentions don’t guarantee good outcomes, and that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Nuclear power requires the same: ambitious deployment balanced by rigorous oversight; market innovation balanced by public accountability; federal leadership balanced by state and community consent.

This is not a question of whether nuclear power is “good” or “bad.” It is a question of whether Americans can build institutions—regulatory, corporate, political—capable of responsibly harnessing immense technological power for shared prosperity without sacrificing safety, equity, or environmental stewardship.

The naval program proved it can be done. The Vogtle cost overruns proved how it can go wrong. The next decade will reveal whether America learned the right lessons.

One thing is certain: The decisions made now will shape energy, environment, economy, and security for the next century. May we choose wisely—with eyes open to both promise and peril.